Abstract-In a wireless sensor network (WSN), the sensor nodes (SNs) generally localize themselves with the help of anchors that know their own positions. In this setting, the localization process has a high risk of being subverted by malicious anchors that lie about their own position and/or distance from the SNs. In this paper, we propose an efficient scheme that helps the SNs identify these malicious anchors and discard them from the localization process. We introduce the concept of the bound circle of an anchor with respect to an SN as the circle whose center is at the anchor and whose radius is the estimate of the distance between the anchor and the SN. Two bound circles may intersect, resulting in at most two intersection points, of which at least one point is close to the true position of the SN, such a point is defined as a proximal point. Pairwise intersection of bound circles results in a dense cluster of proximal points around the position of the SN. This is true even when some of the anchors used by an SN for localization are malicious and are colluding with an aim to have the SN localized at a false position. We propose CluRoL, a technique that helps each SN to localize itself accurately, using a clustering mechanism that performs clustering of these proximal points. Using the resulting cluster the SN is able to identify the false anchors and exclude them from its localization process. Our technique is decentralized and can be easily used by the standard sensors. Simulation results indicate that when the malicious anchors are not colluding CluRoL can identify on an average more than 72% of them. CluRoL performs even better when the malicious anchors are colluding in an attempt to localize an SN at a false position, identifying more than 85% of the malicious anchors. CluRoL also has very low false positives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Large scale distributed wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have become popular in both the military and civilian domains because of their infrastructureless nature and relative ease of deployment [1] . However, there still exist many fundamental problems that need to be addressed [7] . The problem of robust localization of the wireless nodes is one such problem. In an infrastructureless WSN, for cost effectiveness, not all nodes are equipped with self-localizing capabilities. Most sensor nodes (SNs) localize themselves using the position estimates of a group of nodes in the network called anchors [10] , [11] , [13] . Each anchor is a fixed wireless node that knows its own position accurately, either through GPS or from preprogrammed information.
In this paper, we assume that Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA) [13] , [15] , is the underlying mechanism used for localization. Following the TDoA method, each When u gets a sufficient number of location references from anchors in its vicinity, it can use them to estimate its own position. The estimation can be done using the Minimum Squared Error (MSE) (also known as the minimum mean square error) method [10] , [15] given by,
where iu is an estimate of the real position u = (u, zuy) of u, ai = (ai.,aiy) is the position of anchor ai, dju is the estimate of the distance between ai and u, calculated by u using the TDoA method, and Au is the set of anchors from whom u receives the location references. In the absence of measurement errors, u is the correct estimate, that is, u u u l = 0. In the presence of measurement errors, the error in fu is dependent on the measurement error. In this scenario, accurate localization is fairly complex as it is difficult to bound the estimation error. The presence of malicious (lying) anchors makes accurate localization significantly more difficult. We demonstrate this with illustrative simulation results. Motivation: In our illustrative simulation set-up, each malicious anchor lied in a way that its distance from an SN it is involved in localizing is in [d, d * (1 + E)], where d is the true distance and E = 0.5 (for this illustration only). Fig. l(a) shows the average of the square of the localization error (Serr) over 20 iterations, when lying anchors are included in the localization process. Fig. l(b) shows Serr when the lying anchors are not included in the localization process. We would like the reader to note the difference in scale of the Y-axis in the two figures and point out that the value of Serr when the number of lying anchors is 0 is the same in both cases. It is easy to see that the error in localization when malicious anchors are included is an order of magnitude higher than when the localization is done with only the true anchors. In Section II, we present related work. In Section III, we present the system and threat models along with our assumptions. Section IV presents our proposed mechanism, while Section V presents the simulation results. We conclude our paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK Localization schemes in WSNs may be classified as rangebased and range-free. The range-based mechanisms [3] , [5] , [10] , [16] , perform localization by measuring properties such as point-to-point distance or angle estimates, whereas the range-free mechanisms [6] , [8] , [9] , [11] , [15] do not require any physical measurements to perform localization. Rangefree mechanisms may use hop count or area-based estimation to localize a node [6] . Generally, range-based mechanisms lead to more accurate localization. However, they tend to be resource intensive and may require specialized hardware [13] , [ 16] . The method used for position estimation may be based on minimum mean/median square estimation [10] , [15] , convex programming [2] , [4] , or triangulation [16] .
Many schemes have been proposed [5] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [16] to increase security and robustness of localization by performing secure localization, location anomaly detection, or location verification. Accurate localization in the presence of malicious anchors that are transmitting erroneous estimates has been dealt with in [5] , [10] , [11] . The schemes in [5] , [10] attempt to identify the anomaly and perform compromiseresistant localization, whereas the scheme in [11] attempts to detect and remove the malicious anchors from the network.
Our scheme CluRoL, is fully distributed. It allows the SNs to localize themselves with high accuracy, in the presence of colluding malicious anchors, without any external assistance. The Least Median Square (LMS) based scheme proposed by Li et al. [10] is the only other scheme with similar objectives. In this paper, we compare the result of CluRoL with the LMS scheme. CluRoL results in more accurate localization than LMS and also has much lower time complexity. In LMS, to achieve high accuracy, the parameters have to be estimated accurately. This requires a search over an exponential number of subsets of the location references, resulting in higher time complexity. CluRoL, however, is polynomial in the number of anchors.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
The network consists of a set of anchors A {ai, 1 ....,K} and a set of sensors S = {si, i = 1 . L} that are deployed randomly and are fixed after deployment. Each anchor ai knows its own position ai (ai = (ai, aiy)). The transmission range of the SNs is r > 0 and that of the anchors is R > r. The anchors are equipped with radio/ultrasound transmitters and can transmit both signals simultaneously. The SNs are equipped with both radio and ultrasound receivers. All devices have omnidirectional antennas. The anchors broadcast their location references periodically. The measurement error in the distance estimate is proportional to the actual distance of the anchor from the SN u. The measurement error proportion for the estimate of the distance between ai and u is a uniform random variable, 5iu " l [ -6max, 6umax] The anchors transmit their references encrypted using a key from a hash chain. The key is released at a later time instant (delayed key disclosure mechanism), similar to the ,uTESLA scheme [14] .
A. Assumptions
When the malicious anchors are not colluding, each malicious anchor ai from whom an SN u receives location reference lies independently, with the resulting false distance estimate diu = d/u(l + ciu), where d'u is the measured distance between ai and the SN u and E -U[- Emax, Emax] is the lying proportion, where Emax is an unknown constant. The malicious anchors can also collude by changing their distance estimates so that the SN localizes itself at a false position (xf). For a malicious anchor ai, if dif = liai -Xf 1l, then the false distance estimate dif of ai is such that dif ,v_ U[dif (1 - 
. If the number of anchors from which an SN receives location references is N, then an upper bound on the number of malicious anchors M that can be handled is given by M < [Nj2 -2. This upper bound on the number of malicious anchors for accurate localization was proved in [12] , when the measurement errors were absent. This bound also holds when measurement errors exist. The SNs are pre-deployed with the position information of all the anchors in the network. Since the number of anchors in the network is generally small, this is feasible. The anchors have the ability to generate and store hash chains of the keys used to authenticate the location references. The deployment authority (DA) knows the last value (Ko) of the hash chain for each anchor, which can be used to verify any element of the chain. The DA installs Ko of each anchor in each SN during pre-deployment.
B. Threat Model and Security Assumptions
In a WSN, the adversary may be classified as, either an outside adversary or an inside adversary. An outside adversary is not part of the network and generally is more powerful than the SNs. It has bounded abilities to jam or eavesdrop on communication, compromise legitimate nodes, and inject false nodes in the network. An inside adversary on the other hand, is a node in the network that has been compromised. The inside adversary is also a potent attacker as it is a part of the system and hence is privy to the shared secrets. We assume that the malicious anchors may be compromised by a powerful external adversary to lie about their distance references. Hence the malicious anchors are internal adversaries. In this subsection, we use ai to denote a malicious anchor.
The use of delayed key disclosure by the anchors for transmitting their location references ensures that malicious anchors in the neighborhood cannot change or replay the references. Another potent attack is collusion. The malicious anchors can collude to localize the SN at a false position, Xf. The colluding anchors can choose Xf in the network and manipulate the value of their distance estimates such that Xf is the most likely position obtained by the SN when it performs localization. CluRoL addresses all these possible attack scenarios and helps the SNs perform robust localization.
We note here that distance enlargement/reduction attacks may also be caused by denial of service (DoS) attacks. These attacks may be prevented by using error correcting codes or spread spectrum techniques [17] . We do not consider DoS attack in our threat model. by the solid (blue) circles. We assume that all the anchors are true, and that the distance estimates of the anchors are error-prone. Anchor A has negative measurement error (its distance estimate is less than its correct distance from u), while the rest of the anchors have positive measurement errors (their distance estimates are greater than their correct distances from u). If there were no measurement errors, all four bound circles would intersect at node u. However, due to the presence of measurement errors, not all of the bound circles may pass through u. The bound circles of any two true anchors can intersect at at most two points. Let intersection points be S. Due to the geometry of the bound circles, at least one of the intersection points shall be close to the position of the SN, occasionally both the intersection points may be equidistant from u. As a result, the density of the intersection points is highest close to u, as indicated by the solid red points in Fig. 2 . We refer to these points close to u as the proximal points and denote them by the set Sp.
We note that Sp c S. Even when some of the anchors are malicious, intersections of the true bound circles still results in the creation of the proximal points, with the intersection of every pair of true bound circles contributing at least one point to Sp. This can be inferred from Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3 We note that Cmax shall contain a large number of proximal points, as the pairwise distance of most of these points are below the threshold. As a result, Cmax can be used to approximate Sp. However, it is likely that SF \ Cmax #t 0.
We prove in Theorem 1 that this shall not result in significant false positives, that is, true anchors identified as malicious. The theorem computes the probability that at least one proximal point resulting from a true anchor exists in Cmax and hence the probability that the anchor is identified as true. Given that the number of proximal points in Cmax is k, the probability P that none of the k points are points of intersection of ai with another true anchor is given by, fl = ( (1) -
For all possible values of k, the expression inside the pair of braces is no greater than 1. Therefore 7 < (_ 1)k Thus the (y±lj)k.
probability of atleast one intersection point of the true anchor aj being present in Cmax is 1 -P > 1 (7+j)k
The theorem indicates that if findMaxCluster is used, the probability of false positive is low. For illustration, let N = 8, then a = 5 and the number of proximal points is 15. Even if k is as small as 5, the probability that a true anchor is identified as true, is 0.87, which is a fairly high probability. This indicates that using findMaxCluster will result in low false positives. It is also possible that Cmax contains more than one x C S \ Sp. In that sense our findMaxCluster is pessimistic, as Cmax could potentially contain some points of intersection of malicious bound circles thus resulting in false negatives. However, we note that our emphasis is on the reduction of false positives at the expense of some false negatives.
We would like to note that even when the malicious anchors are colluding, the set Cmax would comprise of a large number of proximal points. When the malicious anchors collude this results in the creation of another set of closely placed intersection points near the false position of u. However, the cardinality of the cluster resulting from these points cannot be larger than the cardinality of the cluster containing the proximal points, as M < T. B. Identification of malicious anchors using CluRoL Now we are ready to present CluRoL, which uses the clustering algorithmfindMaxCluster to identify the malicious anchors, removes them from the localization process, and localizes the SN u with high accuracy.
We describe CluRoL as Algorithm 2. Line 2 performs initialization of the variables, S, EX, and Cmax. ancStatus is an array that contains the status of the anchors obtained from the points of intersection of Bi1 and B,2. Thus, tT shall be incorrectly identified as malicious, resulting in a false positive. At the same time, m1 and m2 might be identified as true. Lines 16 to 24 attempt to reduce such false positives even further. Since there is no way of identifying if a measurement is subject to positive/negative measurement error, we use the estimate of each anchor to define two conservative estimate bounds, the Upper Bound (UB) and the Lower Bound (LB) as shown in the algorithm. If an anchor is true, the position of the SN u is inside the circle drawn with UB as the radius, while it is outside the circle with LB as the radius. CluRoL uses the points of Cinax to approximate Sp, whose points are representative of u. If at least one of the points in Cnax is such that it falls within the UB and LB circles of tT, then tT is identified as true, even if none of its intersection points belong to Ciax. This technique also results in malicious anchors that lie very little, such as m1 and M2, to be identified as true.
However, this is unavoidable, as any malicious anchor ai that lies such that (1 + 5ju)(1 + Eju) << (1 + 5max) cannot be distinguished from a true anchor subjected to measurement errors, thus cannot be identified by any mechanism.
If an anchor ai is not identified by CluRoL. This implies that there exists no x C Cmax such that x lies within the UB and LB circles of ai. This is possible if ai is lying, thus ai is identified by CluRoL as malicious with high likelihood.
In line 2, the position of the SN is estimated using the MSE method. Only the estimates from the anchors identified as true are used in the procedure. The running time of Algorithm 2 is O(N4 log N). We note that in general the number of anchors from whom a SN receives location references is fairly small, hence the running time of Algorithm 2 is reasonable.
The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of CluRoL in identifying malicious anchors increasing the accuracy of localization.
in subsection IV-A. Line For the results in Fig. 4 of malicious anchors caught when they collude is because the intersection points of their bound circles are farther from the position of the SN due to their collusion, thus they are not identified as true in lines 2 to 2 of Algorithm 2. This demonstrates the effectiveness of our scheme. In the figure, the curves depicting the malicious anchors caught start at N = 6, as for N < 6, M < U. If a malicious anchor lies such that the false estimate is within the allowed maximum error, it cannot be caught. We do not consider such anchors as malicious in our simulations study.
In Fig. 5 , we show the result of the comparisons of CluRoL with the Least Median Square (LMS) scheme [10] , and the standard MSE method using all the anchors. For each configuration of number of anchors and number of malicious anchors, we perform 100 simulation runs. The figures show the average error in localization ( u -u) over all possible values of M for a given value of N. Fig. 5(a) shows ui u -ul given that the malicious anchors are non-colluding. As already illustrated in Section I, use of MSE without filtering the malicious estimates results in significant error in localization. With the LMS technique the error in localization is reduced significantly, however, with CluRoL the performance is even better. This is because in the LMS scheme, an estimate that deviates from a calculated threshold by a chosen constant factor, is identified as an outlier and not involved in the localization process and the corresponding anchor is identified as malicious. However, inaccuracies in the choice of the factor can increase the false positives or false negatives. The accuracy of LMS depends on the number of subsets of the distance estimates used to identify the parameters. Larger the number of subsets more accurate is the scheme. To get the best possible result requires exponential time in N, as all subsets of the set of estimates need to be enumerated. In CluRoL on the other hand, the use of the points in Cmax to approximate SF and hence to represent the position of the SN and the use of UB and LB help reduce the false positives. More importantly CluRoL has significantly less time complexity in comparison to LMS.
When the malicious anchors collude, the error in localiza-
